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Managers of pension funds in the UK are more and more concerned about the losses that 
might result from the majority of the members of the schemes living longer than expected. 
Providentially, to assist them in handling the problem, there is a panoply of actuarial and 
financial products designed to prevent the schemes from having very high losses, or even 
becoming insolvent. One of these products (and the main topic of this work) is the Longevity 
Swap. 
This report was developed in the sequence of a curricular internship at the Lisbon office of 
Willis Towers Watson. The principal work developed during the internship was directly 
related to valuing the liabilities of pension funds. 
Although the tasks I performed during the internship were not directly related to longevity 
swaps, this issue really caught my interest. This happened because not only longevity risk is 
a pressing problem for pension funds, and as such is extremely worrying, but also because 
it was a topic studied during the master’s course, so it was very interesting to be able to 
cross this bridge. 
Moreover, the study of a real case, allowed me to better understand how pension funds 
work in the UK. This proved to be very important, as funds in the UK, due to the complexity 
of some of them, have a very particular way of functioning. 






No reino Unido, os gestores de fundos de pensões estão cada vez mais preocupados com 
as perdas que podem advir do facto de a maioria dos membros dos esquemas que gerem 
viverem mais do que o esperado. Providencialmente, para os ajudar a lidar com o problema, 
existe uma panóplia de produtos atuariais e financeiros, projetados para impedir que os 
fundos sofram perdas demasiado elevadas, que os possam inclusivamente levar à 
insolvência. Um desses produtos (e o principal tópico deste trabalho) é o chamado Swap de 
Longevidade. 
Este relatório foi desenvolvido na sequência de um estágio curricular no escritório da Willis 
Towers Watson, em Lisboa. O principal trabalho desenvolvido durante o estágio esteve 
diretamente relacionado com a avaliação das responsabilidades dos fundos de pensão. 
Embora as tarefas desempenhadas durante o estágio não estivessem de forma explícita 
ligadas aos Swaps de Longevidade, o tema pareceu realmente interessante, não só porque 
o risco de longevidade é um problema premente para os fundos de pensões e, como tal, é 
extremamente preocupante, mas também porque foi um tópico estudado durante o curso 
de mestrado. Assim, foi muito motivador estabelecer essa ponte. 
Adicionalmente, o estudo de um caso real possibilitou uma melhor compreensão do modo 
como os fundos de pensão funcionam no Reino Unido. Isso provou ser muito importante, 
uma vez que, devido à complexidade de alguns deles, os fundos no Reino Unido têm uma 
maneira muito particular de funcionar. 
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Pension funds in the UK that have promised many years ago benefits to their members are 
seeing increasing difficulty in fulfilling those promises given the unfavourable movements 
in recent years. Though there are more impactful risks to a pension scheme, longevity risk 
is not one to ignore. For many years, mortality has been slowly decreasing. This poses a risk 
for pension schemes because an unexpected decrease on mortality will lead to pensions in 
payment for longer than anticipated. As such, assumptions on mortality improvements are 
constantly revised to allow for this constant evolution in mortality rates (Swiss Re 2018). It 
is now important to understand mechanisms that would allow the scheme to deal with the 
risk of their members living longer than expected. For this purpose, a type of insurance 
called Longevity Swap has been created. Longevity Swap is one of the mechanisms that 
allow for de-risking a pension scheme and that solely focuses on longevity risk (Nicholl 
2018). 
In this report, it will be explained how Longevity Swaps work, how they compare to other 
de-risking techniques and how they could impact on a pension scheme.  
The work was developed as part of an internship agreement at Willis Towers Watson and 
the topic emerged from a conversation about de-risking pension funds. At a certain point it 
was suggested that I should do a study on this type of de-risking technique.  
Both the internship and the topic chosen for the report made me aware of the dimension 
of the longevity risk, which was a topic covered in the Master’s Degree course. A case study 
with a real client greatly contributed to a better understanding of how pension funds work 
in the UK. In fact, pension funds in this country have a very particular way of functioning, 
due to the complexity of some of them. 
The questions that should be covered in this report are: What are Longevity Swaps? How 





The text has the following structure: Chapter 2 introduces the basics of pension schemes; 
in chapter 3, we discuss the setting of assumptions on mortality, essential when considering 
the longevity risk; Chapter 4 contains the application of a longevity swap to a real client; 




2. Pension Funds Basics 
In order to explain what a Pension Fund is, it is important to start by explaining what a 
Pension Plan (or Pension Scheme) is. 
2.1. Pension Schemes 
A Pension Scheme is a type of saving scheme aiming to fund benefits to its members after 
retirement. Each scheme will have a defined set of rules which determines how benefits are 
managed and calculated. Rules may cover: age retirement, late retirement benefits, 
disability or death benefits.   
A pension scheme is a long term savings plan, where the members make deposits of a part 
of their regular income, in order to have a source of income when they retire. These 
deposits are called contributions and they are deposited into a fund. The fund will then 
invest the money and be responsible to pay the members’ pension upon retirement.  
There are several types of pension schemes, but the focus will be on occupational pension 
schemes. 
2.1.1. Occupational Pension Schemes 
According to (OECD 2005) an Occupational Pension Scheme is a type of plan in which the 
access is “linked to an employment or professional relationship” between the plan member 
and the sponsor (the entity that establishes the scheme). Therefore, the plan “may be 
administered directly by the plan sponsor or by an independent entity”. 
In this type of scheme, the contributions are usually done by both the employer and the 
employee. Upon retirement, the benefit will depend on which of the following categories 
of pension schemes is applicable for the members: 
• Defined Benefit (DB) schemes; 
• Defined Contribution (DC) schemes; 
• Hybrid schemes. 
2.1.1.1. Defined Benefit Schemes 
Defined Benefit (DB) pension scheme is defined in (EIOPA 2019) as a “retirement plan that 
guarantees a specific retirement benefit amount for each scheme member”. This means that 





On this type of scheme, the sponsor would bear almost all the risks. This means that on top 
of the normal contributions that the sponsor makes, additional contributions may also be 
required to cover deficits for the scheme derived from unexpected events. This is due to 
the fact that benefits are calculated using a pre-defined formula, with guaranteed increases, 
that must be met at the time of retirement. If for some reason the fund believes that the 
benefits are at risk of not being met (due to a low funding position), they would require the 
sponsor to contribute with additional funds to improve the scheme’s funding position. 
DB pension schemes have their advantages to the sponsor, especially if the sponsor is the 
employer, as it can be seen as a reward for the employees due to good service (therefore, 
a stimulus). 
Because Willis Towers Watson only works with Defined Benefit Pension Schemes, we will 
only be focusing on this type of schemes. 
2.1.1.2. Defined Contribution Schemes 
In (EIOPA 2019) it is described that a Defined Contribution (DC) scheme is a “(…) retirement 
plan that is funded primarily by the scheme member while the employer matches 
contributions to a certain amount.” 
Nowadays, this kind of funds is preferred by employers due to the level contributions being 
fixed, which allows the company to more accurately set up their liabilities and not worry if 
the value may increase. For the members it can be worse, because they are the ones bearing 
the risks of the fund not performing as expected, usually with low information and tools to 
better manage their pensions. 
2.1.1.3. Hybrid Schemes 
Hybrid schemes are pension plans that combine characteristics of both DB pension schemes 
and DC pension schemes. 










The core work at Willis Towers Watson is to provide advice to Pension Schemes, not only in 
how to manage their liabilities, but also their assets. In particular, at the LSC (Lisbon Service 
Centre) is where the Liabilities of some of this pension schemes are calculated.  
The main reference for this section is (The Pensions Regulator 2018). 
The core of the valuations are the assumptions used. At the LSC, there are two types of 
assumptions that are mainly worked with: 
• Economic Assumptions: discount rate, inflation rate (for in payment pension and in 
deferred pension) and salary escalation for Active membership. 
• Demographic Assumptions:  
o Mortality rates – These assume the rate at which the population (in this case, 
the members) die. On top of these assumption, it is associated 
improvements to the mortality rates, where the assumption lies on mortality 
reducing throughout the years due to, for example, medical improvements. 
o Withdrawal rates – These assume the rate at which the members leave the 
company. In pension schemes with vested rights, it’s common to find 
situations where once the members leave, their pension starts getting 
revaluation increases (revaluation is the name given to the increases on 
pension that is not yet in payment, and therefore follows different rules from 
pension increases for members that have already retired). 
o Proportion married and age difference assumption – Whenever the scheme 
does not have actual data on the member’s dependants, the actuaries have 
to assume how many of them are married and what is the age difference 
between the spouses. On most schemes I worked on, the proportion married 
was usually around 70% to 80%, while the assumption regarding the age was 




o Age of retirement in deferment – Assumption for the age at which members 
that left the scheme may choose to retire. 
The reason why it’s impossible to tell the exact value of the scheme’s obligations it’s 
because there are various ways to set the assumptions regarding the expectation for the 
future. Due to these different approaches, there are several types of valuations a scheme 
can perform. The following are: 
• Statutory funding objective (SFO) 
• PPF buy-out/section 179 measure 
• Self-sufficiency measure 
• Insurance buy-out 
• Accounting valuation 
Each type will be looking into the pension in payment for members (Pensioners – Retirees 
or Dependants), pension for members who have left the company’s service but have not 
yet retired (Deferred members) and the prospective pension for members who are still in 
active service for the company (Active members). 
We will go in deeper into each type of valuation: 
2.2.1. Statutory funding objective (SFO) 
This type of valuation was introduced with the Pensions Act 2004. It’s a scheme specific 
type of valuation, where the scheme evaluates the amount of its Liabilities and compares it 
with the amount of Assets. This is the valuation that the Trustees present to the sponsor 
and that is used to calculate the deficit contribution that is needed. It is then essential that 
Trustees are confident that the assumptions used to calculate, not only the Liabilities but 
also the Assets, are prudent enough, considering the investment strategy for the scheme 
and whether the employer has enough liquidity to cover the needs of the scheme. On 




assumptions, sometimes with the intervention of the sponsor) would expect that with their 
assumptions, the scheme would not be underperforming around 60% to 70% of the times. 
Due to this low expectation, these assumptions tend to be less strict than ones that are used 
on other types of valuations. 
These valuations are required of schemes in the UK every three years, though they may be 
done more frequently. 
2.2.2. PPF buy-out/section 179 measure 
The Pension Protection Fund, as defined in (Crown 2019), “pays compensation to members 
of eligible defined benefit pension schemes, when there is a qualifying insolvency event in 
relation to the employer and where there are insufficient assets in the pension scheme to 
cover Pension Protection Fund levels of compensation.” For this purpose, schemes may be 
obliged to pay a levy to the PPF in order for them to secure some of the benefits, in case 
the employer goes insolvent and no insurance company would be able to accept the risk.  
Therefore, every three years, usually at the same time as the SFO, schemes need to conduct 
a PPF valuation. In this case, the scheme cannot control the assumptions used for the 
calculation as they are set out by the PPF, and are usually prudent. 
The PPF does not pay the members’ full benefits because the pensions are capped at about 
90% (there are exceptions where members get the full 100% pension) and the pension 
increases are also set by the PPF and not related to the scheme’s original promised benefits. 
2.2.3. Self-sufficiency 
This type of funding depends on the investment strategy of the trustees, unlike some of the 
previous examples. 
Self-sufficiency happens when the scheme has enough assets to cover the Liabilities and 
there is a reasonable probability that the sponsor will not be called to make additional 




be kept at low risk, in order to minimize the need to fund additional contributions. This 
approach is considered better than a regular buy-out to an insurance company because the 
investment strategy is similar but the Liabilities would be lower as there wouldn’t be the 
need to guarantee profits for an insurer. 
In this type of valuation, the assumptions are still set by the scheme’s actuaries as well as 
the trustees and they are prudent, to get an idea of the necessary Assets that are needed. 
This sets out the funding necessary for the scheme to be fairly confident that they could no 
longer depend on the employer. 
2.2.4. Insurance buy-out 
In an insurance buy-out, it is assumed that the scheme will be buying the accrued benefits 
of all their Liabilities from an insurance company. In this type of valuations, the assumptions 
that the scheme might have, need to be the ones that would be used by the insurance 
company as they are the ones who would calculate the present value of the annuity that 
the scheme would buy, accounting to the fact that there are associated expenses (e.g. 
administration expenses) and also an allowance for a profit for the insurance company (as 
they would not accept the risk in exchange for nothing).  
Performing this valuation would give an estimate of the amount of assets necessary to 
proceed into a buy-out contract, either for de-risking purposes, or to prepare, in case the 
sponsor gets insolvent. If this happens, an insurance company would accept the risk only if 
the scheme has enough assets to pay the buy-out premium. In case it doesn’t, the scheme 
would have to ask for the help of PPF. 
2.2.5.  Accounting valuation 
This valuation is undertaken with the purpose of reporting the funding level in the Reports 
and Accounts and it follows the rules set out in the accounting standards of the company’s 




the ones who would ask for it as it is important that these are present in their Reports & 
Accounts in order for the shareholders to know that the company has the pension scheme 
as a liability. The basis of assumptions are set out according to the accounting standards 
that apply in the home country. For example, in the UK, the discount rate used must be 
based on AA bonds (because they are of high quality) regardless of the scheme’s investment 
strategy. The main purpose following these accounting standards is that companies can 




3. Risks for Defined Benefit Schemes 
A pension fund has risks associated, like any other financial instrument/institution. In order 
to make a better management of the fund, it is fundamental to understand and quantify 
the underlying risks. 
With respect to the liabilities values, the main risk is that the assumptions that are set out 
are too optimistic. As set out before, to calculate the value of the liabilities for the scheme, 
the Trustee’s and the scheme’s actuaries would need to define assumptions, either 
Economic or Demographic, however, it may happen that the actual experience for the 
scheme is too adverse, which could lead to losses. 
In this section, and from now on, we will be considering the three main risks regarding the 
evaluation of liabilities for pension funds: 
• Longevity risk; 
• Interest rate risk; 
• Inflation rate risk. 
3.1. Longevity Risk 
(Blake et al 2006) ((esta referência já existe, no original eu tinha-me esquecido de 
acrescentar na lista de referências, além de já cá estar)) define Longevity Risk as “the risk 
that members of some reference population might live longer, on average, than 
anticipated.”  
Pension schemes promise to pay benefits for the whole member’s life (and sometimes 
dependant’s as well). The scheme sets out assumptions on mortality for its members, but it 
may happen that mortality is lower than expected and the scheme has to pay pension for 
more time than expected. Therefore, longevity risk has been more and more a concern for 
Trustees of DB pension schemes, due to the fact that scientific and medical breakthroughs 
may continue to allow for a greater life expectancy for members of pension funds, without 
these improvements being taken into consideration. 
When setting up the benefits, some schemes did not take this risk into account as they 
would not expect mortality to improve at such a rapid rate as it actually did. This eventually 
resulted in more pension in payment than expected, which resulted in higher liabilities as 
well. This is a very hard to control risk, because the scheme cannot foresee how long the 




of the members. If the scheme believes it is not able to maintain the risk, it could start 
considering hedging strategies, for example, by purchasing annuities. These are called de-
risking methods, which will be explained further below, but these mechanisms would allow 
the scheme to transfer the risk to another party that could benefit from having it on their 
risk portfolio. 
Longevity risk is also a worry for insurance companies, because (in the case of life insurance 
companies) the benefits that they pay are dependent on the member’s mortality. 
3.2. Interest Rate Risk 
Interest rate risk is the risk that interest rates are not as expected in the future. Interest 
rates are important when setting up the present value of the liabilities. If in the future the 
interest rate is lower than expected, that means that the value of the liabilities is higher 
than anticipated and vice versa. 
3.3. Inflation Rate Risk 
Most schemes in the UK have pension increases dependent on the inflation rate, so it is 
necessary to also model these rates to get better values for the liabilities. In the case of 
inflation rate, the risk is that the rate may not be as expected by the scheme and either 
create situations when the increase in payment is greater than expected, creating a loss and 
probably resulting in more contributions to the fund. 
 
To note that when setting these assumptions, the scheme needs to consider that too 
prudent assumptions can result in high contributions from the sponsor, as well as 
unintended surpluses for the scheme. This is unfavourable to the sponsor, because if 
contributions were exceptionally higher than needed, this would limit the liquidity for the 
company to manage their own assets. 
Therefore, it is important to have a prudent state of mind (so, expect higher inflation rate), 







3.4. De-risking techniques through the purchasing of annuities 
3.4.1. Buy-in/ buy-out   
These are the main and most important contracts that pension schemes can use to lower 
their risk.  
Buy-out contracts are those where the pension scheme transfers the responsibility to pay 
the pensions to its members to an insurer, through the payment of a premium. In this type 
of contracts, all the risks associated to those members are transferred to the insurer, so in 
terms of risks for the liabilities, the scheme would be covered against longevity risk, inflation 
risk and interest rate risk.  
In this type of mechanism, the scheme would transfer all the members of the scheme to 
the insurer. The latter would then have to set up a new contract with each member. In this 
situation, the scheme would be transferring all its risks to the insurer/members (the 
members are at risk of not being offered the same benefits from the insurer as they were 
with the scheme, because the insurance company would be making individual contracts 
with the members). 
In a buy-in contract, the scheme would not transfer the responsibility of the payment of 
pensions to the insurer, keeping the administration of the fund. It would pay the present 
value of all the liabilities to the insurer plus a premium. The insurer would then transfer the 
actual payment of pension periodically. This would mean that the scheme would transfer 
the main risks (interest rate risk, inflation rate risk and longevity risk) to the insurer, but 
would gain counterparty risk (risk that the other party of the contract, in this case the 
insurance company, is unable to fulfil the payments). Counterparty risk on buy-ins are 
actually very concerning, because the scheme has already given up the whole liabilities’ 
worth in assets.  
3.4.2. Longevity Swaps 
A longevity swap works like a buy-in contract. The scheme retains the members and the 
responsibility of the payments but, unlike the buy-in, that covers most risks in the liabilities, 
the longevity swap only covers longevity risk. This means that the scheme still has to bear 
the inflation and interest rate risks. 
In the longevity swap, the pension scheme will be making regular payments to the insurer 
based on the expected mortality rates, while the insurer will make the payments to the 




understand how each risk affects the liabilities of the pension scheme, we are going to break 
them down below. For the purpose of this explanation we are assuming that all members 
are of the same age and share the same mortality rate. 
 
3.4.2.1. Mortality effect 
The scheme has the responsibility to pay its members. At year 0, the pension in payment 
is 𝑃0. During the year, some members died at a rate of 𝑞𝑥,1, meaning that their pension 
ceased payment. This means that at year 1, the actual payments needed to be done 
are 𝑃0(1 − 𝑞𝑥,1), which is the pension in payment times the percentage of members that 
survived. Given that the scheme entered into a longevity swap, the insurer agreed to pay 
the actual value of payments, so 𝑃0(1 − 𝑞𝑥,1) and in return it would receive from the 
scheme the expected amount of the payments, i.e. the total pension at year 1 calculated 
using the expected mortality rate, which is 𝑃0(1 − ?̂?𝑥,1). The swap here was the scheme 
exchanging an unknown rate 𝑞𝑥,1, by a known rate ?̂?𝑥,1. This means that whatever the 
mortality is, the scheme will always just pay 𝑃0(1 − ?̂?𝑥,1). However, if mortality was lower 
than expected (i.e. members lived longer than anticipated), then entering into the longevity 
swap was the right thing to do because the actual payments are now larger than the 
expected and there is an implicit gain to the scheme. The other way around, if mortality was 
higher than expected (i.e. members lived less than what was expected), the scheme could 
have paid less had it not entered into the longevity swap and there is an implicit loss. This 
can be translated as: 
• Negative cash flow to the insurer: −𝑃0(1 − ?̂?𝑥,1) 
• Positive cash flow from the insurer: 𝑃0(1 − 𝑞𝑥,1) 
• Profit/loss of: 𝑃0(?̂?𝑥,1 − 𝑞𝑥,1) 
The profit for the scheme is obtained if ?̂?𝑥,1 ≥ 𝑞𝑥,1, so if mortality is lower than expected. 
The loss is obtained when ?̂?𝑥,1 < 𝑞𝑥,1, so, when mortality is higher than expected. For the 
insurance company it’s the other way around. 
3.4.2.2. Interest rate effect 
Interest rate risk is not covered by the longevity swap, so it does have an effect to the 
pension scheme. The scheme, that has to pay the agreed amount of 𝑃0(1 − ?̂?𝑥,1 ) in one 




expected payment to the insurer will be:  
𝑃0(1−?̂?𝑥,1)
(1+?̂?1)




× (1 + 𝑖1), but due to the swap, it still needs to pay the insurer the 
amount 𝑃0(1 − ?̂?𝑥,1), and receive from the insurer 𝑃0(1 − 𝑞𝑥,1). Considering this 
transactions as present values, what we actually get is: 

















(?̂?𝑥,1 − 𝑞𝑥,1) 
A loss is, like above, only realized to the scheme if mortality was higher than expected. 
There is also another effect to take into consideration. The scheme expected an interest 
rate 𝑖1̂but the rate verified during the year was 𝑖1. There is an actual gain/loss adverting 
from this experience. This is due to the fact that if 𝑖1 ≥ 𝑖1̂ then more pension was accrued 
than what was originally expected, creating a surplus for the scheme. Otherwise, the 
scheme expected pension to accrue at a higher rate than the one that was actually verified 
meaning that it created a deficit that the scheme wasn’t expecting. 
3.4.2.3. Inflation rate effect 
Like interest rate risk is not covered by the longevity swap contract, so is the inflation rate 
risk. The technical provisions have to be calculated assuming an inflation rate. After one 
year, when the time comes to pay the members’ pension, both the payment from the 
scheme as the payment from the insurer will be updated according to inflation. This means 
that if the scheme was expecting to pay 𝑃0(1 + ?̂?1)(1 − ?̂?𝑥,1) and expecting to 
receive 𝑃0(1 + ?̂?1)(1 − 𝑞𝑥,1) it will actually pay 𝑃0(1 + 𝑟1)(1 − ?̂?𝑥,1) and receiving 
 𝑃0(1 + 𝑟1)(1 − 𝑞𝑥,1). Like this, the inflation rate risk is still being borne by the scheme and 




Now considering interest rate and discounting the cash flows to the present day, what we 
get is: 








The implicit gain/loss from entering the swap is: 
 𝑃0(1 + 𝑟1)(1 − 𝑞𝑥,1) 
1 + 𝑖1
−
 𝑃0(1 + 𝑟1)(1 − ?̂?𝑥,1)
1 + 𝑖1
=
 𝑃0(1 + 𝑟1)
1 + 𝑖1
(?̂?𝑥,1 − 𝑞𝑥,1) 
From the inflation rate experience, one can also draw some profits or losses. If inflation 
during the year was higher than expected, then the member will be receiving more pension, 
meaning that the scheme would have to pay more than expected. On the other way around, 
if inflation was not as high as initially expected, the scheme would be making a profit 
because it was expecting to pay more than it actually has to. 
Summarising the three effects in force here: 
1. The interest rate effect: 
𝑃0(1 + 𝑅1̂)(1 − ?̂?𝑥,1)
(1 + 𝐼1)
−
𝑃0(1 + 𝑅1̂)(1 − ?̂?𝑥,1)
(1 + 𝑖1)
=






2. The inflation rate effect: 
 
𝑃0(1 + 𝑅1̂)(1 − ?̂?𝑥,1)
(1 + 𝑖1)
−





(?̂?1 − 𝑟1) 
3. The mortality effect, due to the longevity swap: 
𝑃0(1 + 𝑟1)(1 − 𝑞𝑥,1)
(1 + 𝑖1)
−





(?̂?𝑥,1 − 𝑞𝑥,1) 
By analysing the effects, we can see that if 𝑖1 > 𝐼1, the scheme would be making a gain and 
vice versa would be making a loss; if 𝑟1 > ?̂?1the scheme would be making a loss and vice 
versa it would be making a gain; finally, if ?̂?𝑥,1 > 𝑞𝑥,1, the scheme would be making a gain 




In order to better understand the effects of this transaction, it would be better with an 
example. Assuming that the pension scheme entered a longevity swap to cover 50 million 
in pensioner’s liabilities. The idea is to analyse what could the following year for the pension 
scheme. The insurance premium is not going to be taken into consideration for the purpose 
of this example and it will be assumed all the pensioners are the same age, for simplicity. 
The best estimate assumptions for this scheme are: 
• ?̂?𝑥,1 = 23% 
• ?̂?1 = 5% 
• 𝐼1 = 1% 




The actual experience was: 
• 𝑞𝑥,1 = 20% 
• 𝑟1 = 4% 
• 𝑖1 = 2% 
Assuming that the scheme does not enter into a longevity swap and given this information, 
it is possible to understand the overall effect of this experience. If everything had turned 
out as expected, the present value to be paid at year 1 would be: 
£50
1+1%
∗ (1 − 23%)(1 +




(1 − 20%)(1 + 4%) ≈ £40.78. The overall experience resulted in a loss 
of−£0.76 million for the pension scheme. Let’s break down the effects below.  
At year one, the pension that was expected to be paid was 
£50
1+1%
(1 − 23%)(1 + 5%) ≈
£40.02, but given the decrease in the mortality rate (or increase in longevity rate), the 
scheme actually has to pay now 
£50
1+1%
∗ (1 − 20%)(1 + 5%) ≈ £41.58, resulting in a loss 








(1 − 20%)(1 + 5%) = £41.58 and the actual payment due is 
£50
1+1%
(1 − 20%) ∗
∗ (1 + 4%) = £41.19, making a profit of £0.39 million. Finally, taking the discount rate 
effect, the expected value at year one was
£50
1+1%
(1 − 20%)(1 + 4%) = £41.19, but due to 
the increase in the discount rate, the actual value at year 1 is 
£50
1+2%
(1 − 20%) ∗
(1 + 4%) ≈ £40.78, thus making a profit of £0.41 million. The sum of the realized 
profits/losses is −£0.76 million, as expected. 
Above, it’s explained the pension scheme’s experience had it not entered into a longevity 
swap. Let’s now consider the experience had it entered into one: 
There was an increase in the interest rate, so the scheme expected to pay 
£50
1+1%
(1 − 23%) ∗
(1 + 5%) = £40.02, but accrues 
£50
1+2%
(1 − 23%)(1 + 5%) = £39.63, thus making a 
profit of £0.39 million.  




(1 − 23%)(1 + 5%) = £39.63, however, considering the true inflation, the 
present value of what the pension scheme has to pay now at year 1 is −
£50
1+2%
(1 − 23%) ∗
(1 + 4%) = £39.25, thus making a profit of £0.38 million due to the increase in the 
interest rate.  
The two effects above would happen if there was a longevity swap or not, however the 
effect for mortality is the following: 




(1 − 23%)(1 + 4%) = −£39.25, 






(1 − 20%)(1 + 4%) = £40.78. 
The scheme will make an implicit profit of £1.53 million. 
The overall profit from entering into the longevity swap was £2.30 million versus the loss 
of not entering into the longevity swap, which was −£0.76 million.  
Because the longevity swap is a type of insurance, it is usual that the insurer would require 
a premium. Through talks with consultants who are actively involved in the longevity swap 
market, the usual experience that WTW has had is that the premium is around 5% of the 
cash flows for the period. This premium is paid at the same time as the scheduled premium 
cashflow for the insurer. This means that unlike what was presented above, the present 








In practice, the EPV of the liabilities for the scheme would be: 




+ (1 +∝2)(1 − ?̂?𝑥,1)(1 − ?̂?𝑥,2)
(1 + 𝑅1)(1 + 𝑅2)
(1 + 𝐼1)(1 + 𝐼2)
𝑃𝑥,0 + ⋯
+ (1 +∝𝑛)(1 − ?̂?𝑥,1)(1 − ?̂?𝑥,2) … (1
− ?̂?𝑥,𝑛)
(1 + 𝑅1)(1 + 𝑅2) … (1 + 𝑅𝑛)
(1 + 𝐼1)(1 + 𝐼2) … (1 + 𝐼𝑛)
𝑃𝑥,0] 
𝑃𝑥,0  and ?̂?𝑥,𝑡 have the meanings set before and:  
𝑅𝑡 – Random variable that represents the inflation rate at time 𝑡; 
𝐼𝑡 – Random variable that represents the interest rate at time 𝑡; 
∝𝑡 – The loading the re-insurer asks for each cash flow at time 𝑡.   
Compared to a buy-out, the longevity swap would not cover as many risks (buy-out covers 
most risks), but it would also not demand a higher premium for two reasons. First, the 
administration of the pension scheme would still be made by the trustees, instead of by the 
insurer that offers the buy-out; this means that the premium for longevity swaps does not 




the loading would only take this type of risk into consideration, unlike a buy-out that has a 
lot of coverage so the insurer would demand a higher premium. 
In a buy-in, the main risks are covered, specifically longevity risk, interest rate risk and 
inflation risk. This greater amount of coverage compared to a longevity swap results in a 
higher premium being demanded. Also, although longevity swaps introduce another form 
of counterparty risk, it is not as dramatic as in the case of a buy-in. In fact, the premium is 
paid periodically, so, in the case that the insurer would be unable to continue the payments 
to the members, the contract would be breached and there would be no more payment of 
premium. The most worrying part is that while the longevity swap is in force, there is no 
need to update mortality assumptions, because the scheme would be paying the expected 
value of the pension, however, once the payments from the insurer stop, the scheme would 
be liable to longevity again and certainly would need to update their assumption. If these 
result in a higher pension in payment overall, the funding position would decrease and 
deficit contributions could be necessary. 
In both buy-ins and buy-outs, the premium is paid once and upfront and in the case of a 
buy-out, there is an asset transfer to the insurer. However, longevity swaps, by having a 
regular premium instead of a single premium are preferred either by schemes that do not 
have a great amount of assets or big schemes that believe they can manage interest rate 




4. Mortality Assumptions 
One of the responsibilities of the pension scheme’s advisor is to set up adequate mortality 
assumptions. On one hand too prudent mortality assumptions may result in prohibitively 
high normal contributions from the company, on the other hand too relaxed assumptions 
may create deficits that need to be offset by deficit contributions from the sponsor. For the 
trustees it’s also important that the assumption be as accurate as possible because it’s in 
their best interest that the plan doesn’t get insolvent (The Pensions Regulator 2008). 
Willis Towers Watson has its own model to measure the mortality rates. This model takes 
into account not only past experience, but also medical analysis and, using a stochastic 
mortality tool, future improvements. However, throughout my internship, all the schemes 
I worked in used the Continuous Mortality Investigation tables. The Continuous Mortality 
Investigation, according to (CMI 2019), is a company owned in its entirety by the Institute 
and Faculty of Actuaries that produces mortality and sickness rate tables for UK life insurers 
and pension funds.  These tables are based on previous experience from the population of 
England and Wales and span around 5 years. 
In a longevity contract, the mortality basis used to estimate the cash flows must be agreed 
between the ceding company and the reinsurer and based on the best estimate at the time 
of signing the contract.  
Therefore, it is important to set the right assumptions in order to not incur in unnecessary 
losses with the contract. 
4.1. CMI standard mortality tables 
The main reference for this section is (IFoA 2019a). 
The Continuous Mortality Investigation, the main provider of mortality tables used at WTW, 
publishes regularly updated mortality tables for members based on experience conducted 
by Pension Schemes advisors and Insurance companies. The main tables used at Willis 
Towers Watson are the ‘S1’, ‘S2’ and ‘S3’ tables. These tables come from a set called “SAPS” 
which stands for Self-Administered Pension Schemes, which takes into consideration actual 




The ‘S1’ series are base mortality tables based on 2000-2006 experience, collected by 30 
June 2007; the ‘S2’ series are based on 2004-2011 experience, collected by 30 June 2012 
and the ‘S3’ series are based on 2009-2016 experience, collected by 30 June 2017. 
These series have base mortality tables specific for status and sex and can be presented in 
either lives or amounts (light or heavy). The tables start at age 16 and assume that by age 
120 all members have already passed away. Because this report will only deal with 
pensioners, the tables to consider are: 
 
Pensioners 




Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
S1 
S1PML S1PFL S1NML S1NFL 
S1IMA S1IFA 
S1DML S1DFL 
S1PMA S1PFA S1NMA S1NFA S1DMA S1DFA 
S2 
S2PML S2PFL S2NML S2NFL 
S2IMA S2IFA 
S2DML S2DFL 
S2PMA S2PFA S2NMA S2NFA S2DMA S2DFA 
S3 
S3PML S3PFL S3NML S3NFL 
S3IMA S3IFA 
S3DML S3DFL 
S3PMA S3PFA S3NMA S3NFA S3DMA S3DFA 
Table 1 - Mortality tables published by the CMI. Source: IFoA 2019 
For each of these, you can also have a suffix, either “_L” or “_H”, indicating if the table is 
light or heavy. The heavy tables are calculated using experience from members that don’t 
earn much income/pension and assume that people with lower income will live shorter. 
Light tables use the opposite membership and also assume exactly the opposite as what the 




If we consider the table S2PFA_L, we are looking into the experience of High income female 
members taken between 2004 and 2011 and with mortality rates weighted by amount 
(pension or salary). 
4.2. CMI Mortality Improvements tables 
Every year, the Continuous Mortality Investigation releases new life tables (IFoA 2019b) that 
take into account fresh information regarding mortality but also improvements that are 
expected to occur in the future, taking into consideration breakthroughs that have 
happened. 
In order to start setting the model, it is important to understand how to calculate the 






• 𝑞𝑥,𝑡 is the mortality rate for age 𝑥 at year 𝑡. 
This takes into consideration the mortality rate that was verified for age 𝑥 during the year 
𝑡 and compares it with the mortality for the same age group the previous year. This 
calculation gives back the percentage of mortality that was lost due to the improvement. 
Because we assume that mortality keeps improving, the rate is always smaller than 1 (and 
greater than zero). Throughout the years between 2011 and 2017, mortality improvements 
have been consistently lower each year, which is now revealing a trend in life expectancy 
(Palin 2017). 
In practice, at the LSC, it’s used the improvements tables from the CMI. These are published 
every year and aggregate information regarding mortality for population of England and 
Wales, based on the data by the Office of National Statistics (ONS). The mortality 
projections are based on the CMI projection model above. 
The tables are subdivided by the year they refer to, sex and adjustments to the mortality 
rates.  The first year where mortality projections were calculated was 2009.  
Tables are can also have adjustments to the rates (IFoA 2019b). This adjustments are 




mortality rate to explain long-term mortality improvements: 0% means that the scheme 
does not consider any more long-term improvements than the one that is already reflected 






5. Application of a Longevity Swap on a Real Client 
During my internship at Willis Towers Watson, I had the opportunity to talk to some 
consultants about their experience with schemes that entered into a Longevity Swap. After 
a recommendation, I decided to use a scheme that did one longevity swap a few years ago. 
The purpose of this case study is to understand how the longevity swap impacts the scheme 
and to try and quantify the positive and negative impacts. 
This scheme, that for confidentiality reasons will not be identified, is located in the UK, as it 
is the case with all the clients I worked on during the internship. 
It is then important to understand how mortality has been in the past few years in the UK, 
to understand the background of the scheme’s membership. 
The following graph aggregates the number of deaths per each year in England and Wales, 
per 100 thousand lives, between the years of 2001 and 2018 (ONS 2019)
 
Figure 1 - Deaths per 100.000 population in England and Wales between 2001 and 2018. Source: ONS 2019 
As expected, longevity has been increasing for the regions of England and Wales in recent 
years, with the exception of 2015 where an increase in mortality happened, due to 
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Taking this data into consideration, it makes perfect sense that Trustees appeal to Actuaries 
to consider de-risking mechanisms to protect themselves against longevity risk. 
Such was the case for this scheme. Around 2012, the scheme decided to hedge the longevity 
risk and in 2013 the Trustees and the Company implemented a longevity swap.  
At 2013, the scheme was covering liability for members of all statuses: Actives, Deferreds, 
Retirees and Dependants. Each status is divided into three sections, depending on the role 
that the employee had on the company. The longevity swap that was agreed upon, would 
cover the main section of the Retirees and Dependants population. From this point on, 
unless explicitly said otherwise, the reference to Retirees or Dependants is for the Main 
Section members. 
The longevity swap covers liability for 5969 Retirees and 1518 Dependants. 
The financial assumptions used to calculate the liabilities were: 
• Discount rate: 4.86%; 
• Average Increases to pension in payment: 3.2%. 
The demographic assumptions regarding mortality are dependent on the two types of 
members covered: members who have health benefits (like insurance) provided by the 
company and those who do not. The assumptions are different for both types because the 
company assumes that their insured members have better access to health treatments, 
which allows them to reduce their mortality experience, when compared with the non-
insured members. 
The scheme also assumes a lower mortality for females than the one they do for males. This 
is due to prudency. The CMI tables assume a lower mortality rate for females, but: 
1. Most dependants are females; 
2. Around 2/3 of the retired membership is male and assumed to be married to a 
female. 
Therefore, the scheme believes that most of the future payments will end up being for 
females, who already have a higher longevity.  
Table 2 shows the mortality assumptions agreed between the scheme and the insurance 
company. From this point on, all the cash flows from this scheme are going to be based on 




 Insured Non-Insured 
 Males Females Males Females 
Base Table S1PMA_L S1PFA_L S1PMA S1PFA 
Multiplier 100% 105% 105% 119% 
Improvements 2013 CMI Mortality Projection Model with long term 
improvement of 1.50% 
Table 2 – Mortality assumptions agreed between the scheme and the insurer. Source: Scheme’s Experience Information 
Form 
5.1. Impact of changing the long-term longevity improvement rate 
To understand the effects of the longevity swap, it is important to look at the scheme’s 
situation for these members had it not entered into the swap. For simplification purposes, 
it will be assumed that the scheme would use the same economic and demographic 
assumptions on a valuation with and without the longevity swap. This assumption may be 
realistic for the economic assumptions, as they are not affected by the scheme entering into 
the swap, but may not be very realistic regarding the mortality assumptions, since the 
insurer would always try to set very prudent assumptions. However, this scheme already 
uses very prudent assumptions for the calculation of their technical provisions, which 
means I do not expect the increase in prudency to be material for the results. 
Using these assumptions, the total value of the liabilities for these members would be 
estimated as £1,810.6 million. Aggregated with the value of the rest of the membership that 
will not be covered by the swap, the total value of the liabilities would be £5,326.4 million. 
Taking this into consideration and also that the assets are £4,789.02 million, the funding 
level of the scheme would be 90%.  
Because the cash flows for the members who will not be covered by the swap are not 
expected to change if the scheme decides to enter into a longevity swap contract, it is 
unnecessary to look into them. It is important, however, to compare the expected cash 




The following figure shows the expected cash flows if the scheme does not enter into a 
swap. 
Figure 2 - Expected cash flows for the members that were covered by the longevity swap. Source: Author's calculations 
using Cash Flow Viewer+ 2019 
From year 1 to 13, the cash flows are increasing every year, which on a first analysis was 
unexpected, but it is actually very easy to understand. The increases according to inflation 
create a negative impact for the scheme as they amplify the payments that are due, while 
the effect of mortality is actually positive for the scheme, as it reduces the amount of 
pension to be paid. What happens in these first thirteen years is that the effect of inflation 
is so much heavier than the effect of mortality that for the first years the scheme actually 
expects to pay more pension than in the year before. From year 13 on, the effect of 
mortality surpasses the effect of inflation and the expected pension in payment starts to 
decrease.  
Another interesting point to notice on this graph is that by year 64 the pension in payment 
will be residual, suggesting that in 64 years almost all of the pension for these members has 
been paid out. Taking into consideration that the average age by pension of these 
membership is approximately 71 years old, this means that the scheme expects that by year 
64 only the youngest members of the scheme. From this, is very clear how much prudency 
is set into these assumptions.  
We are going to assume now that the long-term longevity improvements would be 0.25% 
higher per year. Taking this into consideration, the liabilities for the scheme would increase, 
























considered. The liabilities would now be £5,374.9 million, meaning that the funding position 
decreased by 0.9%. In conclusion, the increase in the longevity assumption, decreased the 
scheme’s funding position from 90% to 89.1%. 
These are now the expected cash flows, assuming such a change: 
From the graph above, it is very clear that the improvement in longevity resulted in higher 
cash flows. This was expected, because now we are assuming that members live longer, so 
they would be receiving pension for a longer period. 
We have done the comparison of the scheme’s position with all the members, but now, 
looking into the liabilities for the members that would be covered by the swap. The initial 
expected liability was £1,810.6 million, while the expected liability if mortality decreases is 
£1,826.4 million.  As we can see, for this population, the increase of 0.25% pa in the long-
term longevity resulted in an increase of 0.8% of the liability for the main pensioner’s 
section. This impact would be around £16 million, which is not that immaterial, however, 
given that the percentage difference in liabilities is so small, only 0.8%, it becomes clear that 
the assumptions for mortality were already too prudent. If not, an increase in longevity 






















Figure 3 - Comparison between the expected cash flows using 1.50% long-term improvement rate and the cash flows using 




5.2. Impact of entering into the contract 
The scheme decided to cover the liabilities of their pensioner’s main section. For reference, 
the liability that is not affected by the swap is of amount £3,515.9 million. 
The implementation of the longevity swap will affect the expected payments that the 
scheme has to make, although the pension that the pensioners will receive will not change. 
The reason for this is the fact that the members’ actual pension is now paid by the insurer, 
while the scheme has to pay the expected pension plus the premium to the insurer. To make 
the transaction simpler, the scheme will pay the member’s actual pension and then: 
1. If the actual pension is less than the expected pension plus the premium, the 
scheme would pay the pension to the member and the difference to the insurer; 
2. If the actual pension is greater than the expected pension plus the premium, the 
scheme would pay the whole member’s pension and be reimbursed of the 
difference between the actual pension and the expected pension plus premium by 
the insurer. 
The main difference in entering into the longevity swap is that any change in the mortality 
rates would not affect the amount of the liabilities. Therefore, in the most simplistic set of 
mind, comparing with what was presented above and with the longevity hedge in force, the 
scheme would not expect to increase or decrease their funding level relative to these 
members. This is explained by the fact that the insurer is the one that is taking on the risk 
of the mortality rate changing.  
5.2.1. Case 1: Actual mortality lower than expected 
In the case that mortality is lower than expected, the scheme will have more cash flows to 
pay than initially expected because members are living longer than anticipated. However, 
because the insurer agrees to pay the difference between the actual and the expected 




provision for the additional £15.8 billion in liabilities that resulted from the mortality being 
lower than estimated. 
The liability that is not covered, is still sensible to the change in the mortality rate. This 
change would increase the non-covered liability to £3.5 billion and the funding level would 
be now at 89.3%. 
Comparing the scenarios, if it so happened that there was a decrease in the mortality rates, 
the scheme’s funding level could drop from 90% to 89.1%, however, due to the swap, the 
funding level would actually just decrease to 89.3%.  
5.2.2. Case 2: Actual mortality higher than expected 
On the other way round, suppose that mortality would have increased. In case the scheme 
entered the longevity swap, it would have to maintain the scheduled payments to the 
insurance company while the latter would be paying the actual pension to the members. 
Because mortality is assumed to increase, the pension in payment would be lower and the 
insurer would be making an immediate gain and would be reducing their liabilities, while 
the scheme’s liabilities would not change. However, had it not entered into the swap, the 
scheme would be making a gain and decreasing its liabilities. 
Overall, the effect that the longevity swap would have on the scheme is that it would fix the 
liability amount in case there was any change in mortality rates. This feature is what makes 
longevity swaps so attractive in the first place. Whether members live longer than 
accounted for or not, the liabilities are not changing, so the scheme would not need 
additional contributions from the sponsor, due to longevity risk. 
5.3. The effect of the premium 
The insurer always demands a premium for accepting the risk that the scheme is trying to 
hedge. After all, longevity swap contracts are a type of insurance, in this case, against the 




In the case of this scheme, the premium demanded was 3.65% of all cash flows, payable 
yearly. This would mean that on top of the liability that the scheme would have to provision 
for, the £1,810.6 million, they would have to now provision for an extra £66.09 million, 
bringing the total liability of the scheme to £1,876.69 million. 
The expected value of the liabilities in case there was a 0.25% pa increase in the long-term 
longevity improvements was £1,826.4 million. This means that the scheme would actually 
worsen its funding position by entering the swap. The funding position would now be 88.2%. 
Therefore, if this is the expectation that the scheme has for the longevity rates, entering 
into a longevity swap would not be worth it. 
5.4. Actual Experience 
In the sections above, we assumed an improvement of 0.25% pa of the long-term mortality 
rates and came to the conclusion that the improvement was not great enough to pay back 
the high premiums that are demanded. However, this increase in the mortality is a 
prediction that is being made. We were testing the longevity swap against a change of the 
assumption. In this section, we will be looking at the actual experience taken from the 
valuation of 2016. 
Between 2013 and 2016, there were 365 male deaths, which correspond to £6.2 million of 
pensions that stopped being paid, while female deaths were 228, which correspond to an 
amount that stopped being paid of £1.9 million. This means that had the scheme not 
entered into a longevity swap, and considering that it assumes that 80% of the retirees are 
married, that their spouses receive 50% of the members’ pension in payment and that £1.1 
million stopped being paid due to the actual dependants’ mortality, the scheme would have 
stopped paying £5.4 million in pension. Given that the scheme expected to stop paying £4.8 
million in pension during the period, it would have actually made a profit of £0.6 million. 
This profit is explained by the member’s mortality being higher than expected, indicating, 




5.4.1. Payments from the scheme 
Nevertheless, the scheme entered into the contract, meaning they are obliged to pay the 
expected cash flows to the insurer. Those were estimated, in thousands, three years ago as: 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
119,161 119,697 120,135 
Table 3 - Estimated cashflows for the three years between 2013 and 2016 
These, however, do not reflect the actual payments to the insurer, because these assume 
that there is a pension increase of 3.2% pa. 
The actual increases in payments would be based on the September retail price index and 
they were, according to (WTW 2019): 




Table 4 - September RPI. Source: WTW 2019 
In the first year, the inflation rate was exactly what was expected to be, so the actual 
payment to the insurer during year 1 was £119.2 million. For year two, though, the actual 
increase was much lower than expected so to get the actual cash flow that year, we remove 
the expected inflation (two increases of 3.2% that were given by the software) and then 
multiply by the actual increases, so 
119,697,333.7
1.0322
× 1.032 × 1.023 =£118.7 million. As for 
year three, the actual cash flow to the insurer is 
120,134,500.8
1.0323
× 1.032 × 1.023 ×
1.008 =£116.3 million. Calculations above show the gain that the scheme had on the 





Therefore, the cash flows from the pension scheme to the insurer are £119.2 million, £118.7 
million and £116.3 million. 
Focusing on the 2016 experience, the actual pension in payment to the members was 
£106.17 million , but the scheme has to pay £116.3 million to the insurer. Therefore, the 
members are paid their full pension, but the scheme still has to pay an extra £10.13 million 
to the insurer. 
5.4.2. Analysis of surpluses and losses 
Three effects were considered in Chapter 3 as impactful when entering into a longevity 
swap. In this section, it will be understood how each of these affected the scheme. 
5.4.2.1. Inflation rate effect 
Above, it is explained in detail the effect that inflation had on each of the cash flows, due 
to the actual inflation being generally lower than the expected, which was 3.2%. This 
resulted in a gain of £4.9 million to the scheme. 
5.4.2.2. Mortality rate effect 
The mortality experience between 2013 and 2016 was irrelevant, because due to the 
longevity swap, the scheme paid what it was expecting to pay, so no gains nor losses from 
mortality experience. However, had it not entered into the swap, the scheme would have 
made a gain and reduced its liabilities because mortality was higher than initially expected. 
Moreover, had it not entered into the swap contract, the scheme would have saved the 
difference between the expected payment plus the premium and the actual pension. The 
premium paid that year was 3.65% of £106.2 billion, which is £3.9 million plus the difference 
between the expected and the actual payments, which is £10.1 million created a loss of £14 
million for the scheme, just by entering into the swap. 
5.4.2.3. Discount rate effect 
The scheme assumed in 2013 that the discount rate would be around 4.86%, this rate is 




however, the actuaries and the trustees decided to introduce more prudency into their 
discount rate assumption, by decreasing the discount rate to 4%. This decrease meant that 
the scheme provisioned for less money than it actually needed to. In order to understand 
this, we discount the cash flows to 2013 using the original rate assumed and bring it to 2016 
using the new rate. The implicit loss realized will be given by subtracting the actual value to 











(119,161,333.6 + 118,653,461.6 + 116,317,355.3) = −£5.8 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛. 
Thus, entering into the longevity swap, created a loss for the scheme, as seen above, mainly 
because the actual mortality was larger than expected. As for the other effects, the scheme 
made a profit from the inflation rate experience, but a loss from the discount rate having 
changed, having an overall loss of £14.9 million. 
The conclusion I must take from analysing this experience, is that the scheme hurt their 
funding level and could have actually improved if not for the longevity swap. But one thing 
must be taken into consideration: if it was clear that the scheme would make a loss in case 
the mortality rates did not decrease too much (from the beginning it was clear that a 0.25% 
improvement pa on the mortality rates would not be enough to compensate entering into 
the swap contract), why did it enter the swap anyway? 
The answer is the obvious one: de-risking. In 64 years that the scheme is expecting to pay 
the pensions, mortality can actually reduce significantly due to, for example, medical 
breakthroughs or improvements in the lifestyle of members. The fact that the scheme has 
this contract in place will make sure that mortality rates will not influence the amount it will 
pay. Whatever the movement is on the mortality rates, the scheme’s funding is not 
expected to change drastically from mortality experience (though it would need to 
provision for the expected premium, which is 3.65% of the liabilities) and this means 




fund all the pensioners’ pension and not to make a profit and in this sense, entering into a 





During my internship at WTW I had the opportunity to learn much more about how the 
actual valuations of pension funds are performed in practice. I must say that they are more 
demanding than I expected. It was a great experience and the perfect opportunity to see 
how the knowledge acquired during the programme applies in a real world situation. 
The topic I worked on this internship report was not only challenging but also a great 
occasion to get into contact with consultants and understand the work that is done on the 
other side. It does take a village to perform actuarial valuations on pension funds and I am 
glad I could be a part of it. 
The topic of longevity was one that I have covered in class before, especially longevity risk, 
one of the three main risks for pension funds and a major concern. It is a known fact that 
people are generally living longer and defined benefit pension funds in the UK have become 
much more aware of this situation than they were a few years ago. Longevity swaps appear 
as an answer to schemes that are not able to properly manage the longevity of their 
members and prefer to spend more funds on security against this risk. Although longevity 
swaps are a relatively new method, when compared to other annuity purchases, like buy-
ins or buy-outs, the fact that they only cover longevity guarantees that they are cheaper 
and that they do not require schemes to give up a big part of their assets all at once, as the 
other mechanisms do. 
Investigating this topic, I was expecting that the pension fund could have had some more 
positive results from this swap, but I found myself disappointed by understanding the losses 
the scheme faced on those first three years when the swap was in place. These losses were 
due to prudent mortality assumptions and due to the premium demanded by the insurer. 
The market on longevity swaps is relatively new, with new deals being done every year, 
although is not certain that schemes that enter into a longevity swap contract will realise 




they would surely make a loss. My expectation is that as markets evolve, and competition 
between insurance companies grow, the profit margin that is demanded becomes thinner. 
Also, the case study I did only covered three years of the longevity swap, which is a very 
narrow window for an investigation, especially for a product that is meant to last as long as 
the population that it is covering. 
It was interesting to find that schemes enter into longevity swaps even though they know 
that there’s a very high probability of them making a loss. The reason for this is security. 
Longevity swaps do not exist to make profits for the scheme, but to prevent the scheme 
from suffering prohibitively high losses in case mortality decreases more rapidly than 
expected. 
This report was a gateway for me to explore longevity risk and how it affects a pension fund, 
and also the mechanisms available in the market to mitigate this risk. Although there is a 
trend of decreasing mortality improvements for the past years (between 2011 and 2017) 
(Palin 2017), I believe longevity swap deals are still going to happen, because it is expected 
that new breakthroughs on how to reduce mortality may still occur. In fact, investigation is 
continuously being done on how to cure cancer and other health related problems (like 
heart diseases) that affect the older population (Kingston 2019). It will be very interesting 
to find out how the market on longevity swaps will evolve as new schemes and new 
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